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Abstract  
 In today’s sport industry there is a push by players to maintain an 
equitable split in revenues to ensure ownership groups do not exploit them.  
This has been of particular importance over the past five years during 
collective bargaining agreements.  Players associations are not the only 
groups who are affected by the financial management of professional sport 
owners.  Taxpayers and local governments also share an interest in the 
manner owners operate teams.  With an increase in public subsidization of 
sport teams, taxpayers have a natural vested concern for professional sports.   
 The concern on this topic comes with the financial management of 
professional sport teams by owners.  There are documented uses of creative 
accounting practices by owners, which fatten their wallets while often times 
taking advantage of players, taxpayers, and local governments alike.  Owners 
hide revenues and certain expenses to paint a picture of poor financial team 
health to the three parties in order to maximize player salary efficiency and 
public subsidization. 
 In an attempt to correct the current need owners feel to utilize 
creative accounting practices, this thesis developed a regression analysis to 
understand how their fans respond to cost structure of player contracts.  As 
detailed in the latter portion of the thesis, fans of the MLB, NBA, and MLS all 
respond differently to salary structures; proposing a solution to increasing 
player cost efficiency.    
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Executive Summary 
 
 This thesis has two main goals: to investigate and discuss the creative 
accounting practices used by owners in professional sport and propose a 
solution for owners to decrease the use of these generally unethical 
accounting practices.  Over the past decade the accounting side of sport has 
become increasingly important.  The National Football League, Major League 
Baseball, National Basketball Association, and National Hockey League have 
restructured their collective bargaining agreements in this period.  The 
collective bargaining agreements, just like in the remainder of American 
commerce, govern the relations between the employers and employees; in 
sport it is the owners and players respectively.   
 The two major pieces of discussion in professional sport collective 
bargaining agreements are the revenue sharing and player compensation 
models.  Although they are two separate ideas, they are collaborative and 
equally important pieces for player associations.  For revenue sharing there 
are different models and means of equalizing the distribution of revenues in 
the league amongst the teams.   Revenue sharing relates to a certain 
percentage of the teams’ revenues being dispersed in a general pool.  These 
revenues are generally split, based on need, to lower revenue-producing 
teams.  Generally low revenue teams exist because of several reasons 
including: population and income of the region, team history, tradition of 
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winning, and exciting players.  All of these serve as drivers in fan affinity for a 
team.   
 Usually teams are required to share the revenues less the operational 
expenses into the pool and receive a certain percentage back.  The concern in 
this structure is that larger revenue team owners will attempt to expense out 
more revenues into their pockets and thereby sharing less of this profit.  The 
purpose of revenue sharing is to create competitive balance in the league.  
Competitive balance is where teams start to bring in equal bottom-line 
profits and any single team could have the financial opportunity to win a 
championship in a given year.  This is not ideal for large revenue teams since 
they are required to give more to the general pool and will receive back the 
same amount a low revenue team who puts less into the pot.  Therefore 
owners across the board and different leagues have used creative accounting 
practices to share less in their own interest.   
 These accounting practices are important in the second piece of 
collective bargaining agreements: player compensation.  All leagues 
traditionally, except the MLB, have some sort of “cap” on the amount teams 
can spend on their total roster of players.  A cap, as the name implies, creates 
a ceiling for team spending to drive a competitive balance in the league by no 
one team drastically outspending the league average for player salary.   
 The NBA, for example, has a soft cap, which once exceeded taxes the 
team.  The soft cap tax is put into the general pool for revenue sharing, but 
simultaneously allows for a team to theoretically spend large sums in hopes 
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to drive wining-percentage or fan based revenues.  The NFL however has a 
hard cap that teams cannot surpass.  Teams often structure contracts in 
order to fit into this cap; maybe they will pay a player less one year allowing 
them to pay a different player more in that same year.   
 In collective bargaining agreements, players and their 
associations/unions aim to increase the caps on player compensation as high 
as possible.  The owners generally tend to want to decrease the amount they 
are required to spend on talent while maximizing revenues from ticket, 
merchandise, and sponsorship sales.  Revenue sharing allows all teams to 
spend equal sums on players.  With shared revenues, low revenue teams can 
now maximize their spending under a certain cap.  This again gives wealthy 
owners a reason to decrease reported revenues in order to maximize their 
personal profits while winning at the highest percentage. 
 Owners are known for consistently lamenting over their teams’ 
financial instabilities.  This has huge implications for taxpayers and local 
governments.  Due to the local and regional importance of professional 
sports teams in economics and socially, local governments tend to help these 
teams in any way possible.  This thesis cites examples where state and city 
governments are lending or giving large sums of money to support stadium 
constructions and renovations.  In San Francisco, for example, a city council 
created a private group with the same name to borrow money from Goldman 
Sachs, to fund $950 million intended for the new 49ers football stadium.  The 
San Francisco 49ers will act as tenants in the stadium.  However, if yearly 
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payments are not met to pay back the lender, it is likely the taxpayers will be 
the back-up source of funding.  These types of stories have been rampant 
throughout the past decade in the professional sport teams.  This, along with 
tax breaks and special deals for owners and teams, make profits easier to 
come upon for these owners.  Local governments have expectations of 
owners financially, anticipating a giveback to the municipalities and states 
supporting their teams.  The main issue with the expectations is a team is 
likely to pack up camp and move to a new city where they can retain more of 
their revenues.  For a number of reasons, including city excitement and the 
glamor of having a professional sport team, many cities want to host a team.  
More cities want to host teams than there are teams to be spread around.  
This allows owners and leagues to create financial leverage in most 
situations because of the high demand for hosting professional sport teams.    
 All of these situations in the current professional sport financial 
models give owners easy avenues to attempt creative, and at times unethical, 
ways to maximize their revenues.  The last section of the thesis looks to 
create a solution to this paradigm.  Through quantitative analysis the goal 
was to test for fan preferences as it relates to player spending.  If owners can 
understand how to maximize ticket sales (generally an unshared revenue) 
through player salary optimization, then the hope is they may decrease their 
creative accounting habits and perceived need for public subsidization.  This 
quantitative analysis will provide a means of increased efficiency for player 
 8 
spending by owners, and therefore less need for creative accounting 
practices. 
 This thesis explains, in depth, the collective bargaining models of each 
of the big four professional sport leagues, and how owners are, in a way, 
exploiting the revenue-expense systems to their benefit.  Not only does this 
have implications for players associated with the collective bargaining 
agreements, but also has meant a great deal to taxpayers and local 
governments.  With a potential solution for owners to maximize revenue 
through fan preferences, there is a hope to decrease creative accounting 
practices and the stream of public subsidization.   
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Setting the Owners’ Stage 
 
 “That $27.6 million net loss looks bad, but, as you'll see, it's an illusion 
— a trick of accounting, one practiced by every sports franchise with the full 
blessing of American tax law and one we should keep in mind whenever an 
owner pleads poverty (Craggs, 2011).”  Sport Writer Tommy Craggs 
introduces the concept of professional sport owners utilizing creative 
accounting practices to maximize their personal profits; this is the focal point 
of the thesis.  With serious implications for players (in collective bargaining 
agreements), taxpayers, and local governments alike, there will be an aim to 
investigate, understand, and propose a potential alternative to these creative 
accounting practices.  
 Sport is a unique piece of modern culture.  More than ever, sport 
brings different people together in different settings.  From LeBron James’s 
athleticism as he leaps through the air for a resplendent dunk, to hundreds of 
thousands of people coming together on an international scale for the 2014 
Boston Marathon in support of those lost in the previous year’s event, sport 
is an unparalleled event.  The combination of the skill, passion, and 
enthusiasm of participants and enthusiasts alike is not visible in any other 
professional enterprise.   
 Professional sport owners can connect the emotions associated with 
sport teams and cities with the business side of sport to capitalize.  This 
creates a need to grasp the whole picture of the owners’ reach.  In particular, 
as noted in the initial quote, how do accounting practices not only change the 
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face of the sport industry, but also how do these practices affect the 
American population as a whole?  Even though professional sport is a 
business where the ultimate goal is to generate bottom-line profits for the 
owners and investors, it is of particular importance to understand how 
owners and players can create an equitable and mutually beneficial 
relationship while showing respect to the passion and money of fans.  Over 
time most American businesses have created an equilibrium, or at least an 
agreeable system, to maximize utility for the employer, employees, and 
consumers; however, starting in the middle of the 20th century there was a at 
which owners began tightening their grip on the monetary flow associated 
with professional sport. 
 Owners progressively have looked for ways to benefit their wallets, 
which hurt several different parties including: players, small market and low-
income teams/owners, local governments, and taxpayers.  This thesis will 
aim to tell these stories, while suggesting a way to curve the issue of profit 
sharing.  Additionally the hope is to potentially value a franchise, which will 
help create a model for sharing the profits with the affected parties.    
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An Historical Perspective and Creative Practices 
 
 Despite professional sport leagues and affiliated teams being 
considered businesses under the American laws that govern commerce, 
there have been particular laws and precedents putting professional sport in 
a different legal consideration than ordinary business.  Investigating these 
precedents helps to understand how owners have recently strengthened 
their grip on the monetary flow of sport.   
 One such case occurred in 1959 when Bill Veeck, the former owner of 
the Cleveland Indians, argued to the IRS that once professional athletes have 
been paid, they begin to “waste away” or depreciate in value.  This is a 
common term in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), however 
in commerce depreciation is not used for employees.  Veeck, through this 
roster depreciation allowance (RDA), hoped to depreciate his roster like any 
other asset such as an office copy machine, a company car, and a farmer’s 
cattle (Craggs, 2011).  All of these have logical decreases in value over time: a 
copy machine has a definitive useful life, the company car will break down 
with usage, and cattle become less valuable with age.  There is a need for 
depreciation in these cases because of a depletion of the asset capacity.  
Under GAAP businesses should use a conservative mindset.  A player, 
however, is unique and different from depreciable assets.  Players can 
become more valuable or less valuable, depending on a couple of aspects.  
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For example, if the Seattle Seahawks of the NFL signed a young running back 
to a five-year, $20 million contract, this gives the belief that the market has 
the player valued to the franchise and the rest of the league at $4 million per 
year.  If the running back has a great season the market value of the player 
increases; then the Seahawks could in theory trade the player at the end of 
the season for more than the remaining value of $16 million on the contract.  
Additionally, if the running back has a spectacular season the team is likely to 
realize increased revenue in ticket and merchandise sales.   
 It is true, in this scenario, the running back could have a disappointing 
season and not be worth the $4 million spent over the season.  Under this 
thought, it does seem logical for the team to note depreciation on their asset, 
and Veeck has a point.   
 Generally players equal or exceed the contract value, more often than 
coming short.  If the player can be anticipated to equal or exceed the value of 
$4 million to the team more often than be of less value, wouldn’t then the 
conservative mindset be not depreciating the value of the player?  Even 
though the player is generally as valuable on the market after the season, 
Veeck made it possible for teams to recognize two expenses, the depreciation 
expense and the salary expense associated with the player.  This is not only 
important for taxation purposes but, as the story will expand upon 
throughout the paper, players and taxpayers will be affected.   
 When Veeck generated this idea, “the IRS not only agreed with Veeck 
but allowed any owner claiming the write-off to deduct roster expenses twice 
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— first under "player salaries," … and then under "loss on players' contracts" 
— and an enormous tax shelter sprang up within the balance sheets of 
franchises everywhere (Craggs, 2011).” Questions do arise because a team’s 
roster at a particular point in time is not actually depreciating.  Some players 
fade in value with age, while others are developing and improving.  Teams 
will not, however, pay more taxes if a player becomes more valuable.  
Accounting practices hold a conservative mindset, where the lesser of the 
cost of an asset or the fair market value is the distinction in expected losses.   
In accordance with this mindset gains are not reported until they are 
actualized.  “Given this however in the now, owners are taxed less and aren’t 
taxed for selling or trading the player later on (Craggs, 2011).” 
 Owners attempt to bring the most money back to their pockets 
through several financial management strategies. In addition to player 
depreciation, owners find other practices to misrepresent the fiscal health of 
their teams.  One such example is the practice of owners receiving salaries, 
which are counted as businesses expenses that decrease team profits.  “In the 
NFL, some owners have paid themselves ‘salaries’ as high as $7.5 million 
(Hunt, 2011).” George Steinbrenner, famous former owner of the New York 
Yankees, in the early 1980s infamously paid himself a “consulting fee” of $25 
million for the negotiation of the Yankees’ cable contract (TS, 2009).   
 This is continued with owners creating new related businesses 
related to their teams.  Two particular examples of related businesses 
creating additional revenues for the owners are the New York Yankees and 
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Cleveland Indians.  The YES (Yankees Entertainment and Sports) Network, 
which is owned by the same holding company of the Yankees, produces 
revenues for the ownership group and not directly for the Yankees.  This 
network uses Yankees and Brooklyn Nets media content to stimulate 
sponsorship and fan revenues.   
 Cleveland Indians Baseball LP does not own Sports Time Ohio, but 
instead the majority owner of the Indians, Larry Dolan, personally owns 
Sports Time Ohio. “Because the two are legally separate entities, Cleveland 
Indians Baseball LP has no incentive or obligation to factor the profits of 
Sports Time Ohio into the franchise’s accounting picture (TS, 2009).”   
 Both the Yankees and Indians’ ownership groups see the revenues 
from television rights associated with the teams.  However with this 
structure the team itself does not see the revenue and, therefore, will not 
become shared revenue.  This is just one example of how the owners of a 
team can benefit themselves through related businesses. 
 Another way owners can tweak their profit stream to appear weaker 
financially is in the selling and buying of a franchise.  This could play out in 
several ways often relating to interest associated with loans.  
The prospective team owner first creates a new ownership 
corporation. He then loans money to the company, which uses the 
loan as a down payment to buy the team. This loan, plus the interest 
payments, then has to be repaid to the owner from the subsequent 
income of the team, which lowers the team’s stated profit. Once again, 
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the owner pockets the money, and the accounting department records 
it as an expense (Eitzen, 2000). 
The owners will create limited liability corporations or limited partnerships 
to purchase and operate their franchises through loans from the personal 
finances of the owner.  As stated by Eitzen, the operating profits are repaid to 
the owner plus interest over the span of the next several years.  
 These strategic accounting practices used by owners serve to 
maximize owners’ profits.  The examples discussed are just a small portion of 
the many scenarios affecting the public perceived team financial stability, but 
when extrapolated throughout all teams in all four of the major professional 
sport leagues the implications of harm done to players and taxpayers is 
apparent.     
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Collective Bargaining, Revenue Sharing, and Salary Caps 
 
 The accounting models and practices have become of particular 
importance over the past decade as all of the major professional sport 
leagues have restructured their Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs).  
These CBAs, which like other unionized businesses, govern the relationship 
between the owner and players.  An important piece of the CBA is revenue 
sharing models among the teams.  Among the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL 
revenue sharing standardizes the flow of revenues.  The “big four” sport 
leagues each have their own definitions dictating that the particular revenues 
of teams go into a shared pot, while other revenues remain local and with the 
team.  Generally this pot of shared revenues aims to raise competitive 
balance throughout the league, meaning any team has the resources or the 
opportunity to win a championship in a given year.    This means high 
revenue teams are giving a percentage of their revenues to low revenue 
teams, who are conventionally also small-market teams.  The hope with 
revenue sharing is that through revenue redistribution the league as a whole 
can increase in value, helping each team into the black.   
 Through a league-controlled revenue sharing, all teams are given the 
opportunity to spend equally on talented players to increase revenues such 
as ticket, merchandise, and sponsorship sales.  Leagues have, in parallel 
instituted salary caps to control the amount teams can spend on rosters.  
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Salary caps become the second important piece of the collective bargaining 
agreement conversation.  Each league has different rules to govern how 
teams spend their money on talent to maximize profits (revenue after 
expenses).  The salary caps work to guide teams in spending local and shared 
revenues on talent acquisition to optimize fan interest and their bottom lines.   
 Owners however are not as concerned with fan interest and the 
teams’ bottom lines as they are with their own profits.  This opens the door 
for owners to utilize creative accounting practices similar to the one Veeck 
created in roster depreciation allowance.  Each league has their own story of 
different owners creating expenses to have teams appear financially weak.  
This perceived instability not only affects revenue sharing and player 
compensation but can also skew the tax dollar flow between owners and 
local governments. Tax streams, discussed later in the thesis, afford owners 
further opportunities to use creative accounting practices for their benefit.    
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Understanding the Spread 
 
 Each league has its own models for revenue sharing and salary cap 
restrictions aiming to control owner actions, and therefore each league has 
its own stories of owners circumventing sharing to take home additional 
profits.  As stated above these practices by owners can affect players and 
fellow teams.   
 “In the 2009-2010 seasons, the Big Four, which includes the National 
Football League (“NFL”), National Hockey League (“NHL”), Major League 
Baseball (“MLB”), and National Basketball Association (“NBA”), generated 
over $21.6 billion in revenues (Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).”  Scholars 
Dietl, Grossmann, and Lang further state these revenues are governed by, 
“…each league’s respective collective bargaining agreement, which 
establishes a player compensation system and a revenue sharing model 
(Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).”  The purpose of the revenue sharing is for 
a tighter range of payroll spending, preventing the large market teams from 
monopolizing the flow of high-priced free agents.  
 When discussing collective bargaining agreements, the ideas of 
revenue sharing, player compensation/salary caps, and taxes are separate 
ideas but are, in fact, inextricably linked.  Revenue sharing and salary cap 
restrictions are the two points for particular concern under the notion of a 
collective bargaining agreement.  The way these two are governed under 
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collective bargaining agreements differs amongst the major leagues in the 
U.S.   
 Revenue sharing concerns itself with the league creating revenue 
streams and requiring its teams to share those streams based upon different 
standards established by each league individually.  Generally speaking, 
shared revenues primarily include television rights, ticket sales, and 
merchandise sales.  The shared revenues are intended to help the lower 
income and small market franchises create a competitive balance throughout 
the league.   
 Specifically there are two main goals revenue sharing is designed to 
accomplish through the redistribution of revenue: first to ensure the league 
as a whole is in the black (profitable), and to second ensure the big and small 
market teams are on a level playing field.  David Stern, former commissioner 
of the National Basketball Association, stated, "It's about coming up with a 
system, if you think about it, where every team has the same amount of 
chips" (Coon, 2012).   
 Revenue sharing is a layered idea.  It reflects a question constantly 
facing the American economy at large, should those who make more money 
share their profits with those who make less?  Across professional sports it 
has become generally accepted that it is, in fact, better for the league as a 
whole to share the majority of revenue streams.  Sport is a different type of 
business where teams need each other to play and generate revenues.  This 
makes solving the above question more layered.   
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 The traditional model regarding revenue sharing and competitive 
balance recognizes a dulling effect.  This idea, discussed and refuted by Justin 
Hunt, states that, “according to the dulling effect, revenue sharing reduces 
the incentives for clubs to invest in playing talent (Hunt, 2011).” The dulling 
effect argues this is because each club, “has to share some of the resulting 
marginal benefits of its talent investment with the other clubs in the league 
(Hunt, 2011).” 
 Hunt instead asserts, and proves through mathematical analysis, that 
rather there is a “sharpening effect” in revenue sharing.  With this sharpening 
effect large-market teams benefit from the underdog sharing in the total 
league revenue.  Sharing creates a more competitively balanced league where 
marginal revenue has been shown to increase up to a certain equilibrium 
point.  There is a point in cross-subsidization for each league where overall 
utility is maximized through profits and wins.  Each league attacks this aim of 
maximization and the totals designated to the players’ share in a different 
manner.   
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NFL Revenue Sharing and SRS 
 
 The National Football League is seen to have the most successful 
revenue sharing and salary cap model of the big four major leagues in the 
United States.  At the same time, though, the NFL revenue sharing is the least 
complex of the big four and states its purpose is to ensure every club 
distributions equitable totals from designated sources of revenue.  The NFL’s 
revenue sharing model has a long history.  However, two relatively recent 
events significantly shaped the current practice, and further created what is 
seen as unshared revenue.   
 First in 1995, Jerry Jones, owner and face of the Dallas Cowboys (often 
referred to as America’s Team), challenged NFL Properties as the exclusive 
rights holder of national sponsorships and marketing agreements for 
additional, unshared streams of localized revenue.  This helped create a 
divide for NFL franchises between local, unshared sponsorship dollars and 
national, shared marketing totals, which affected the amount of revenue 
distributed.  The NFL controls the official national sponsors, such as PepsiCo 
being the official beverage of the NFL, while teams control local sponsorship 
streams, such as X insurance being an official sponsor of the Dallas Cowboys.  
Jerry Jones succeeded in his challenge and created this separation between 
national and local revenues.   
 In addition,  to this adjustment there was a restructuring of incentives 
for private-public financing strategies in the 2001 and again in the 2006 
collective bargaining agreements.  The restructuring made it more profitable 
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for franchises to either build new stadiums or have arena renovations.   After 
the amendments in the 2001 and 2006 collective bargaining agreements, 
teams were incentivized for making these changes to their stadiums because 
they wouldn’t share new revenues from luxury box, club seat, or personal 
seat licenses (Hunt, 2011).  Personal seat licenses (PSL) are a consumer tax 
where fans are given the right to purchase a particular seat and season 
tickets to that seat.  These fans are given preferential treatment year after 
year, however generally must renew their licenses each year.  The shift for 
increased percentages of luxury box and club seating, as well as PSLs, in 
stadium structure often times out-prices the average fan from attending 
multiple games.  Luxury box, club seating, and PSL revenues have become 
more important, though, over the past ten years with a boom in stadium 
revitalizations and construction because as an unshared revenue owners will 
work to maximize these profits to help their bottom-lines.  
 The NFL breaks down its shared and non-shared revenues as follows: 
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Table 1: Designation of revenues for revenue sharing and the salary cap  
Category Cap 
Calculation 
Revenue 
Sharing 
Allocation  
Gate Receipts Yes Yes 40% Visitors 
Broadcasts Yes Yes Evenly 
Concessions Yes No - 
Local Advertising Yes No - 
Signage Yes No - 
Local Sponsors Yes No - 
Parking Yes No - 
Novelties Yes No - 
NFL Entities Yes Yes Evenly 
Barter Income Yes No - 
3rd Party Stadium Usage Yes Yes/No Situational  
Business Insurance Yes No - 
Promotions Yes No - 
Club/Luxury Box Yes No - 
Premium Seat Revenues No No - 
Personal Seat Licenses No No - 
(Hunt, 2011) 
 As indicated in the chart nearly every revenue figure has an affect on 
the salary cap calculation for each team but only three revenues are 
considered in revenue sharing: gate receipts (or ticket sales), broadcast 
revenues, and NFL entity revenues.  It is conventional among all four major 
sport leagues to share the revenues from ticket sales; the NFL, though, does 
require 40% of ticket sales to go to the visiting team.  The NFL does not 
require a sharing of other revenues, like merchandise sales, which can be 
seen in other models.  The broadcast and NFL entity revenues come from the 
league.  The NFL has deals with CBS and FOX to broadcast games.  Naturally 
the revenues from this deal and associated sponsorships are split among all 
teams, as they all play on CBS and FOX.  NFL entity revenue considers brand 
licensing for many tertiary streams, such as NFL sponsored youth flag 
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football.  There is a large opportunity given to owners to maximize their own 
unshared revenue streams, particularly after the 2006 collective bargaining 
agreement.   
 When allocating shared revenues among teams, the NFL does not 
consider the unshared revenues of teams, which are generally much greater 
for large market teams.  With the restructuring of the collective bargaining 
agreement the NFL created a system called Supplemental Revenue Sharing 
(SRS) to combat the uneven totals that have arisen from the freedom given in 
unshared revenue generation.  Supplemental Revenue Sharing has, 
“redistributed revenue of $895 million over a six-year period from top 15 
revenue clubs to weak small markets (Hunt, 2011).”  This served as a start to 
curve the inequities that may arise, but the issue is, in fact, that the SRS 
numbers reflect revenues and not profits.  NFL owners entertain the thought 
that low revenue clubs may, actually, be more profitable than high revenue 
clubs given a lack of certain financial restraints, like debt and lower facility 
operational expenses. Profit shows true value according to some owners.  
However, the NFL may have a point in using revenues for SRS instead of 
profit because teams can use the creative accounting practices detailed 
earlier to create additional expenses detracting from the team’s stated 
profits.   
 Despite the potential manipulation under the SRS model, the NFL has 
created salary cap restrictions to allow for more equitable competition for 
signing players on the open market.  These caps serve as a way for the NFL to 
 27
control the monetary flow and leave less creativity in the hands of owners.  
For the most part, the salary cap is the total amount teams have to work with 
when signing players, making trades, and drafting rookies.  The key, as 
mentioned earlier, is creating a revenue sharing model where incentives for 
investing in playing talent are at their highest.  Generally, professional sport 
fans are drawn to teams who win.  Winning brings in increased ticket and 
merchandise sales when the team has attractive talent or increased win 
percentages.  Therefore it is important for NFL teams to maximize the talent 
they are able to fit into the cap in order to maximize unshared profits.  
Components of player contracts that count against the cap are base salaries, 
signing bonuses (which are apportioned over the life of the contract), and 
incentives.  If these incentives are likely to be earned they are counted 
against the cap. (Gette, 1996).  
 The percentage of revenues shared is always under scrutiny during 
collective bargaining discussions because players want teams to have a 
larger portion of their revenues dedicated to player compensation.  Owners 
conversely are more concerned with finding the point Hunt discussed where 
the teams maximize fan and team utility and profits.   
 Part of the salary cap and revenue sharing of particular concern in the 
NFL during the latest collective bargaining agreement conversations was 
affected by the reported team revenue figures.  The NFL Players Association 
(NFLPA) has aimed to receive additional compensation for medical coverage 
of retired players.  There are increased cited cases of brain damage within 
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the retired football player community.  The NFLPA aims to bring some 
revenues to benefit these struggling individuals.  The correct apportioned 
total is unclear in this case when the owners misrepresent the revenue 
figures to the NFLPA.  This serves as one example of the effects stemming 
from fiscal misrepresentation on the part of the owners in the NFL, whereby 
revealing a greater picture of concern on the part of the NFLPA. 
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NBA Revenue Sharing and Creative Accounting Points 
 
 There is always uncertainty for players association in collective 
bargaining agreements since the teams are private businesses and do not 
need to report their financial statements to the government.  As a result, 
players and local governments wonder whether the owners are revealing 
sincere financial instability or not.  An interesting turn in the way the NBA’s 
revenue sharing came as a result of the leaked financial documents for 
several franchises including the New Jersey Nets (now the Brooklyn Nets) 
and New Orleans Hornets (now the New Orleans Pelicans).  This allowed for 
a greater public understanding of how the revenue sharing model works and 
the different accounting tactics employed by owners across the league.   
Many similar accounting practices were discussed previously.  The exposure 
of NBA financial statements had particular implications to the use of player 
depreciation by NBA owners.   
 The New Jersey Nets used player depreciation of roughly $25 million 
as an expense in order to decrease shared revenues and tax obligation.  
Tommy Craggs discusses the implications of this in his article by stating, “If 
we're trying to arrive at [an] idea of how much money the Nets really made 
in 2004, we'll need to…knock out the $25.1 million RDA (player 
depreciation) (Craggs, 2011).”  This is again because player depreciation is 
an intangible, paper loss.  Craggs continues,  “…and add the $9.1 million in tax 
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savings. Suddenly, [a] $27.6 million loss becomes a $6.6 million profit 
(Craggs, 2011).” 
 This has been an important point in the NBA collective bargaining 
conversations because David Stern has asserted that the NBA and its teams 
are not running in the black.  Stern uses this as a bargaining chip to keep 
more revenue within the teams as opposed to increasing the players’ share in 
profits.  This may be a tricky way of viewing the overall financial wealth of a 
team because a team should be considered for a sum of its parts.  Similar to a 
Ford motor plant, the motor division, exclusively, may have a negative 
revenue total.  If there were a claim Ford is losing money that wouldn’t be 
sound.  The motor plant sells the product at a price which enables Ford to 
turn an overall profit when the final motor vehicle is sold.  Upon every sale 
value is created for Ford (Craggs, 2011). 
 This is an interesting point and shines a new light.  Should teams be 
strictly viewed as just the revenues and profits associated with the players 
on the court or are their tertiary profits adding to the bottom-line and the 
owners’ wallets?  Craggs makes a valid argument that a company is a total of 
all its parts, and should be viewed as such for many purposes and not just 
collective bargaining agreements.  To expand upon the Nets example and add 
to Craggs point, the team can’t be valued without seeing the numbers for 
other assets.  This includes the recently opened Barclays Center (the Nets’ 
arena), and the remainder of the revenues associated with the development 
of this new arena in Brooklyn.  These associated revenues, because of the 
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holding company structure discussed earlier, affect the true value of the team 
and should change the revenue sharing/salary cap models used in collective 
bargaining agreements.      
 In addition, the players association had other qualms with how the 
league portrayed their losses in collective bargaining agreement talks.  In 
preparation for the most recent collective bargaining conversations, the 
league reported losses of $370 million, but ESPN compiled a team of financial 
experts who were able to remove $250 million of the losses if player 
depreciation and interest associated with purchases of teams was not taken 
into account (Coon, 2012).  When buying a team an ownership group and 
their limited liability corporation generally borrow money in the form of a 
loan.  In 2009, for example, the New Orleans Hornets could have turned an 
operating profit had they not mismanaged their loan system during their 
transition from Charlotte.   
 Teams across the four sports often receive loans for the ownership 
group governing them, however the interest is being paid to the owner.  This 
interest is seen as a profit for the owner of the team, but an expense and a 
loss for the team.  The question around interest expense is a tough piece for 
players to swallow because teams are either mismanaging their loan system 
or that system is purposefully being manipulated by the owners.   
 Further, as the players assert, they should not be burdened with the 
costs associated with buying a team because when a team is sold the players 
do not share in the profit.  The players associations do not have a voice in 
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management decisions and therefore feel they should not be hurt by the cost 
of owners mismanaging team financials.  This concern of the players grows 
as owners are paying millions of dollars each year in interest to help cover 
part of the team’s purchase, as the expense is spread over many years.  
“While these are real obligations and represent real cash going out the door, 
they relate to team ownership, in which the players do not share (Coon, 
2012).” 
 Despite these demurs, the league proposed amendments under the 
new collective bargaining agreement with increased revenue sharing and a 
more stringent player cost containment.  This would hopefully ensure the 
league as a whole is profitable first and then spread the remaining funds to 
small market teams to create more competitive balance.  The players agree 
with robust team revenue sharing, but the league’s proposal of player salary 
cost containment wasn’t ideal for the players association (Coon, 2012).  
Previously the NBA had a soft player salary cap that would only tax a team 
slightly for going over.  The league had hopes of creating a hard cap to lower 
league-wide salaries.   
 After the 2009, 2010 labor negotiations an agreement was settled 
with an emphasis on revenue sharing.  The new model, featuring a complex 
formula to shift financial wealth of big-market NBA teams to the league’s 
most needy teams, was fully phased in during the 2013-2014 season and saw 
a $140 million directed toward revenue sharing.  This sum is compared to 
just $16 million of revenue sharing in the previous plan (Lombardo, 2012).   
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 The NBA created this new system and their own original formulas 
without following any other leagues’ models.  With the new system the NBA’s 
model requires teams to give a fixed annual 50% of total revenues less 
certain expenses, including arena-operating costs, into a shared revenue 
pool.  Teams receive disbursements equal to the average team payroll for a 
given season.  When an NBA team contributes less than the league average 
they are considered recipients; conversely large revenue teams who 
contribute an amount exceeding the average pay into the fund received by 
recipients (Lombardo, 2012).  This revenue sharing model evidently reveals 
the hope of the NBA to bring financial and competitive balance amongst the 
markets.   
 Furthermore the NBA’s shared revenues include sums from league 
revenues, such as national TV sponsorship, but the majority of shared 
revenues come from local revenues.  The bottom seven in terms of revenue 
(the Milwaukee Bucks, Charlotte Bobcats, New Orleans Pelicans, Atlanta 
Hawks, Minnesota Timberwolves, Detroit Pistons, and Memphis Grizzlies) 
will receive a distribution on average of $16 million, which is an increase 
from the just under $6 million maximum in the previous collective 
bargaining agreement (Lombardo, 2012).   
 In addition, the NBA disregarded its old system of requiring teams to 
meet business performance standards developed by a tertiary consultancy, 
and now calls for small-market teams to generate a minimum of 70% of the 
league averaged team revenue to receive the full benefits of revenue-sharing.  
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This standard was created to keep teams from relying completely on shared 
revenues.  By generating a minimum of 70% of the league average, teams are 
required to try and bring in revenue.  Inversely, “Large-market teams must 
generate 130 percent of the league wide team revenue average. Should a 
team fall short of its expected revenue, it must make up the difference in its 
level of contribution (Lombardo, 2012).”  This new plan simplifies the 
expectations, and in a way helps in ridding of some creative accounting 
practices.  If teams do not recognize enough revenues then team will not 
benefit from revenue sharing.  Even though teams can still manipulate 
financials, this new system helps decrease the practices.   
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MLB Revenue Sharing and Creative Accounting Points 
 
 Major League Baseball has taken a different approach to revenue 
sharing and player compensation than that of the NFL, with the updates to 
the collective bargaining agreement starting in the late 1990s.  This change 
came about in 1996 mainly due to the dominance of the New York Yankees 
and Atlanta Braves through the earlier part of that decade.  This was seen as 
an issue with the league’s competitive balance.  The league took it upon itself 
to create a system with higher competitive balance and, as a result, seven 
different teams won the World Series after 1996 in a ten year stretch: Florida 
Marlins 1997 & 2003, New York Yankees 1998-2000, Arizona Diamondbacks 
2001, Anaheim Angels 2002, Boston Red Sox 2004, Chicago White Sox 2005, 
and the St. Louis Cardinals 2006.   
 The collective bargaining agreement in 1996 sought to discourage 
excessive spending by those teams who could afford it.  The owners in the 
MLB are known for spending exorbitant sums on free agent players, and this 
collective bargaining agreement curved unnecessary inflation of star player 
spending by large market teams.  Unlike the NFL and NBA, the MLB does not 
have a salary cap, but instead a competitive balance tax.   
 Developed in the 2007 collective bargaining agreement, a three-tier 
tax system was developed when certain salary cap levels are breached.  “The 
three applicable tax rates under the 2007 CBA are 22.5%, 30%, and 40%. As 
a general rule, a club’s applicable CBA tax increases one level for each 
consecutive year its Actual Club Payroll is above the Tax Threshold,” which is 
 36
set each year (Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).  This discourages teams from 
spending over the tax threshold year after year by increasing applicable tax 
implications.  The MLB system is different from the revenue sharing models 
of other leagues.  “This system is not designed to compensate weaker teams 
in an attempt to ameliorate the risks associated with a large revenue gap. 
Rather, it was designed to remedy any improper…treatment of salary terms 
(Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).”   
 The interesting piece of the MLB system is that 75% of the monetary 
stream created by these taxes goes to ancillary benefits for the players; a tax 
provision created to restrict excessive player spending and send additional 
funding to the players.  This is an intriguing paradigm that exists for this tax 
system in the MLB’s system.   
 Regardless, the remaining 25% stays with the MLB for an Industry 
Growth Fund, which is designed, “to promote the growth of baseball in the 
United States and Canada, as well as throughout the world… (Dietl, 
Grossmann, & Lang, 2010)”   
 Similar to the NFL and NBA, MLB also has a revenue sharing model 
amongst its teams to redistribute the “playing field.” This provision of the 
MLB’s collective bargaining agreement suggests two main sources of 
redistribution existing within the revenue sharing model: a base plan with a 
central fund component and a Commissioner’s Discretionary Fund.  The base 
plan component was designed to ensure each club contributes 31% of their 
net local revenues to a general pool, which is divided equally among all 
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teams.  Net local revenue is defined as, “Local Revenue (gross revenue from 
all revenue areas like ticket sales, concessions, etc. minus Central Revenue, 
which is national television and radio, etc.) minus Actual Stadium Expenses” 
(Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).  Some owners have contention with this 
system, however, because large market teams who generally contribute more 
are distributed a sum equal to those who give less to the central fund.  This 
table shows the point taken by some owners,  
Table 2: MLB Base Plan Redistribution: 31% Net Local Revenues. 
Club 31% Contribution Distribution Club Status 
New York 
Yankees 
$62,800,000 $42,075,000 Payor 
Florida Marlins $27,000,000 $42,075,000 Payee 
Cleveland Indians $31,000,000 $42,075,000 Payee 
San Diego Padres $47,500,000 $42,075,000 Payor 
Total $168,300,000 $168,300,000  
(Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010) 
 The chart shows four teams as an example of the base plan 
redistribution based on the 31% contribution from the team’s local revenues.  
All four teams have different contribution totals because each team 
throughout the entire league brings in different revenue amounts throughout 
a given season.  Despite the different contribution levels, all teams receive 
the same redistribution of $42,075,000, which is the given year’s average 
contribution.  The difference, either a surplus or deficit, of contribution less 
the distribution indicates whether a team is a payee or payor.   
 A large revenue team like the New York Yankees contributes over 
double the amount of a small revenue team like the Florida Marlins and 
receives an equal sum causing a loss in this regard for the Yankees.  This is 
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one main avenue Major League Baseball uses to create competitive balance 
amongst its teams.  As noted above, a club receiving a distribution greater 
than their 31% contribution (i.e. Florida Marlins and Cleveland Indians in 
this chart) has additional funds under the base plan.   
 The other main component of the MLB’s revenue sharing plan gives 
the Commissioner control of a discretionary fund.  This is supplemental 
funding that upon special request can be given in a sum of no more than $10 
million to a team, detracting from the central fund of the base plan that is left 
over from revenue sharing (Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).  Maintained 
yearly, this discretionary pool, if not distributed, is returned in pro rate to all 
clubs.  “While the Commissioner is not required to satisfy distribution 
requests, he is prohibited from allocating more than $3 million to any 
individual club in a given year (Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).” 
 In 2011 Bud Selig exercised his ability to act in the best interest of 
Major League Baseball as he disbursed $25 million to the New York Mets’ 
owner Fred Wilpon (Shaikin, 2011).  The aim was to help a team who had a 
winning record in just over half of the 25 seasons during Wilpon’s 
ownership, despite being in the largest market.  Selig hoped for a re-
emergence of the Mets and a stimulus to the popularity of baseball in the 
nation’s largest city.   
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NHL Revenue Sharing and Creative Accounting Points 
 
 The National Hockey League adds an additional ripple to the revenue 
sharing and player cost constraint conversation with its Player 
Compensation Cost Redistribution System (PCCRS).  The stated goal is for 
high-revenue clubs to redistribute a certain percentage of their revenues to 
low-revenue clubs for player compensation.  The NHL re-designed the 
system to increase the ability of all teams to allocate a minimum of 25% of an 
accepted team payroll range on player specific compensation (Dietl, 
Grossmann, & Lang, 2010).  Of all the salaries teams expense (coaching staff, 
physical trainers, executives) the National Hockey League expects teams to 
spend at least a quarter of revenues on player salaries.  The NHL has 
established four sources for the basis of the PCCRS; these are described in the 
table below.   
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Table 3: Four Funding Sources in the NHL 
Funding Source Percentage of 
Commitment 
Explanation 
Central League 
Revenues Phase 
Maximum of 25% 
redistribution 
requirement 
If central league 
revenues exceed $300 
million, 50% of excess 
may satisfy up to 25% 
commitment 
Escrow Account Up to 1/3 remaining 
commitment 
Amount from top ten 
revenue clubs cover up 
to 1/3 remaining 
amount 
Playoffs Funding 
Phase 
50% remaining 
commitment 
Playoff teams 
contribute % of playoff 
tickets sold, depending 
on revenue ranking 
Supplemental Phase Remaining Amount Funded by top ten 
revenue clubs, based on 
their revenue 
compared to 11th 
ranked revenue club 
(Hunt, 2011) 
 The first phase of the PCCRS, Central League Revenues Phase, sets a 
threshold of revenue that necessarily is met prior to triggering the sharing of 
the phase.  Once the central revenues, such as broadcasting and licensing 
revenues, exceed the $300 million total in a year, half of the excess can help 
teams satisfy the 25% requirement established above (Hunt, 2011).   
 The next phase, referred to as the Escrow Account, comes into play 
after the Central League Revenues Phase if there is a remaining commitment 
of teams to meet the 25% level of player compensation.  It allows for 1/3 of 
the remaining commitment to be redistributed.  This is a back-up plan of 
sorts where if the league-wide player compensation exceeds the targeted 
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share for player salaries, there is a redistribution commitment to maintain an 
increase in competitive balance (Hunt, 2011).   
 The third source of funding comes from certain playoff revenues.  
Playoff revenues are not always planned, as teams do not know if they will 
make the playoffs.  Therefore they are a throw in and owners have conceded 
to sharing these additionally generated revenues.  Regardless of the 
redistribution from the first two phases, funding in this phase can cover 50% 
of the remaining commitment of teams in the playoffs (Hunt, 2011).  If teams 
make the playoffs but are still unable to meet the 25% requirement, ticket 
sales come to their aid in order to balance out salary related expenses.  Based 
on the level of revenue generation amongst playoff teams, there are varying 
requirements for revenue sharing in phase three.  These rules are shown in 
Table 4. 
Table 4: Calculating the redistributed playoff revenues in phase three 
Revenue Ranking Calculation of Playoff Distribution 
Top 10 Gross 
Preseason and 
Season Revenues 
50% total ticket value, net taxes, for one 
full-priced, sold-out regular game 
Middle 10 Gross 
Preseason and 
Season Revenues 
40% total ticket value, net taxes, for one 
full-priced, sold-out regular game 
Bottom 10 Gross 
Preseason and 
Season Revenues 
30% total ticket value, net taxes, for one 
full-priced, sold-out regular game 
(Hunt, 2011) 
 
 The final source of funding in the NHL’s PCCRS model is the 
supplemental funding phase.  This phase requires top-ten revenue clubs, on a 
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percentage basis, to satisfy any remaining balance under the PCCRS 25% 
commitment.  Based on a formula related to revenue generation, those teams 
are expected to help low revenue teams (Hunt, 2011).  The formula compares 
a team’s revenue value to the relative median and calculates the 
supplemental funding.  It ensures that the highest revenue clubs add in the 
most revenue.  There is a cap with two restrictions limiting the amount top 
ten clubs are required to contribute.  First a team is not asked to contribute 
more than 20% of their revenues to the supplemental funding phase.  Any 
excess over this 20% is dispersed back to the top ten teams on a pro rata 
basis.  The second restriction makes certain no team’s revenue rank will be 
altered as a result of the supplemental funding phase.  If the team’s rank 
would change, the contribution is capped that exact amount (Hunt, 2011). 
 These four phases help set the stage for revenue sharing and 
therefore player compensation.  Much like the other four leagues, the 
discussion of expense consideration lends itself to creative accounting 
practices by owners to control the amount they let the team share with 
fellow franchises and players alike.  In all four phases, top revenue teams are 
asked to help stimulate low revenue teams.  With this in mind small market 
or low revenue teams may find complacency.  There is no need to exert effort 
to be a top tier team if they do not see the reward.  Again the discussion 
comes back to profit and utility maximization for owners.  When the owners 
see some form of taxation coming in their direction with marginal increases 
in revenues, they will find ways to expense out revenues or limit revenue 
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streams.  The National Hockey League’s PCCRS, in a way, entices low revenue 
teams to accept subsidies and not field competitive teams.  This issue reveals 
a need for the NHL to ensure a minimum amount spent on player talent.   
 Creative accounting practices can be seen across the NHL and one 
such example exists in Philadelphia.  Ed Snider, owner of the Philadelphia 
Flyers, claimed a team loss of ten percent on the team revenues.  However, 
similar to the ownership structure of the New York Yankees and Cleveland 
Indians (detailed on page 14 & 15), Snider owns Comcast SportsNet, the 
broadcasting company of the Flyers, and Global Spectrum, the group who 
operates the Flyers’ arena.  The Flyers divert broadcasting revenues and pay 
rent to Spectrum and claim rent expense, this is just shifting money from, 
“one of Snider’s pockets to another (Elliott, 2004).  The NHL has created a 
unique revenue sharing model, but one that is still be manipulated by owners 
for their own personal profits.   
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Leveraging Public Interest 
 
 Aside from the player compensation and revenue sharing 
conversations, owners also have an interest in creative accounting practices 
in the interest of receiving public subsidies and aid from local governments.  
As mentioned in the NFL section, there has been a stadium boom over the 
past five to ten years.  Owners have used the “need” for new stadiums or 
renovations as a point of emotional leverage with the public in order to 
receive public funding.  This has become important for the big four leagues 
because one major source of unshared revenues comes from luxury box, club 
seating and personal seat licenses.  
 In order to maximize unshared revenues and personal profits on the 
part of owners, there is a call for new stadiums to grow these types of 
stadium seating structures.  The main concern with this shift lays particularly 
upon the notion that taxpayers have contributed the majority of funds to 
stadium constructions.   
 As the new stadiums increase the percentage of high-priced seating, 
there is a negative consequence where many of the taxpayers who help fund 
these new stadiums are priced out of attending the games.  If the local 
taxpayers and governments do not financially support the new stadium, 
teams often threaten moving to a new city, one that will aid in a new stadium.   
Given this, the fans who are emotionally invested in their professional sports 
teams and give money to fund the new stadiums are often the ones priced-
out of the games.  The situation becomes a “catch-22” for taxpayers and local 
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governments.  This point has been the start of the conversation on the 
accounting and funding for new stadiums over the past ten years.    
 There was a period where teams were expected to find the majority of 
funding for stadiums from private sources, whether that be from the owner, 
team savings, or private-backers.  However there has been a switch, as these 
two examples indicate.   
 In Minnesota, the Vikings wanted a new stadium, and threatened to 
leave. While the Minnesota legislature faced a $1.1 billion budget deficit, it 
still extracted $506 million from taxpayers as a gift to the team.  This help 
with roughly half the cost of the new stadium (Easterbrook, 2013).  This is a 
prime example of how the Minnesota Vikings ownership leveraged their 
importance in the Minneapolis market to receive a large handout from state 
government who was already facing a staggering financial deficit.   
 The next example indicates how the City of Santa Clara is managing 
the new stadium being built primarily for use by the San Francisco 49ers in 
the 2014-2015 NFL season.  In Santa Clara, California, the city broke ground 
on a $1.3 billion stadium primarily for use by the San Francisco 49ers. The 
deal officially includes $116 million in public funding, with private capital 
making up the rest.  However, a new government entity, the Santa Clara 
Stadium Authority, borrowed roughly $950 million, largely from a 
combination of financial institutions led by Goldman Sachs.  This provided 
the majority of the “private” financing. The board members of this new Santa 
Clara Stadium Authority are the members of the Santa Clara City Council. 
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This indicates, in effect, the city of Santa Clara is covering most of the 
“private” funding. If something in the payment goes awry, it is likely the 
taxpayers will take the hit.  If a true private firm wanted to finance the 
stadium construction that would be a viable solution, however in this 
example members of the city council are making a deal with private capital 
firms.  If the group is not able to pay back the nearly $1 billion loan then it is 
likely the public will have to pay it back through taxation.  
 The stories continue in NFL cities across the country, two such 
examples are in Seattle and Pittsburgh.  The Seattle Seahawks opened 
CenturyLink Field in 2002,  “…with Washington State taxpayers providing 
$390 million of the $560 million construction cost (Easterbrook, 2013).” The 
Washington taxpayers financed nearly 70% of the stadium, despite the 
Seahawks being owned by Paul Allen.  Allen is one of the richest people in the 
world.  The Seahawks payback the state roughly $1 million per year as a 
tenant, “…in return for most of the revenue from ticket sales, concessions, 
parking, and broadcasting (all told, perhaps $200 million a year). Average 
people are taxed to fund Allen’s private-jet lifestyle (Easterbrook, 2013).” 
 The Pittsburgh Steelers serve as the next example.  One of the most 
storied franchises in all of America’s four major professional leagues, the 
Steelers, who play at Heinz Field, have won six Super Bowls, the most of any 
franchise.  “Pennsylvania taxpayers contributed about $260 million to help 
build Heinz Field—and to retire debt from the Steelers’ previous stadium 
(Easterbrook, 2013).”  Again even though the taxpayers funded a large 
 47
portion to build the stadium the majority of game-day and television 
revenues are directed toward the ownership, the Rooney family.  
Additionally the Rooney family also retained $75 million that Heinz paid to 
name the facility (Easterbrook, 2013). 
 Governments may argue that these are valuable investments, and this 
is not unfounded.  Professional sport teams are profit generators.  However, 
many of these investments come at a time when local and state governments 
are cutting funding for education and health services among others.  This is 
demonstrated in the Cincinnati Reds’ new stadium where the sport-related 
subsidies exceeded the amount cut from health and human services in 
Hamilton County, Ohio (Easterbrook, 2013).  If this was not bad enough for 
taxpayers, the elevation in ticket prices associated with new stadiums 
decreases the likelihood of the average taxpayers attending a game with their 
family.   
 An interesting dimension to public subsidization of stadiums comes 
when leagues and teams sign contracts for exclusive rights to license images 
on game days.  For example, FOX and CBS have the rights to broadcast from 
NFL stadiums.  In general, taxpayers have provided the majority of funds to 
build NFL stadiums, and while teams pay local or state governments modest 
rents, they retain exclusive rights to license theoretically public images.  The 
privatization and capitalization of public funds appears to be questionable 
when the public sees no direct return on the “investment.” Judith Grant Long, 
a professor of urban planning at Harvard University, has calculated taxpayers 
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provide 70% of the capital cost of NFL stadiums; only the New England 
Patriots, New York Giants, and New York jets pay 75% or more of their own 
stadium capital costs.  (Easterbrook, 2013).   
 Whether purposefully or not, local governments understand this 
situation in professional sports and concede to the owners.  Professional 
sport teams are generally a loved aspect of cities; teams drive, among other 
aspects, love for a city and tourism revenues.  The teams help restaurants 
and bars; local companies thrive because of the influx of foot traffic and eyes 
on the games.  Sports teams ideally can bring a large influx of dollars to a 
metropolitan area.  On average, fans view sports in terms of wins and losses, 
championships won, and legendary players.   
 With an economic lens, though, professional sports teams appear to 
be a “publicly subsidized business monopoly” (Eitzen, 2000).  The NFL, NBA, 
MLB, and NHL all exercise control of supply over their sports, with leagues 
acting as a cartel of sorts as a group of competitors who control the entry and 
exit of fellow members and join to create mutually beneficial economics.  
This cartel structure reduces competition in geographical or market areas, 
which would cost owners more money.  There is control and regulation on 
spending for services of talented players, acquisition of new talent through a 
draft, and how many teams can be in a league and their location.   
 This brings about a question of legality.  There have been several anti-
trust court rulings preventing professional sport leagues from being viewed 
as monopolies.  One such example is, “the 1961 Sports Broadcast Act allowed 
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pro sport leagues to sell their TV rights as a group, without being subject to 
U.S. antitrust laws (Eitzen, 2000).”  As a result leagues are afforded the 
opportunity to sell the rights to televise all of their games.  
 This sort of structure is ideal for owners because there are rare 
additions into the cartel, making professional sports teams considered to be 
scarce commodities.  Economically such commodities appreciate in value 
more rapidly than other investments.  “In 1998, Forbes Magazine estimated 
that the 113 professional teams in football, basketball, baseball and hockey 
were worth an average of $196 million each — up from $146 million the year 
before (Eitzen, 2000).” 
 The idea of scarcity for commodities has long been accepted as a 
means of value appreciation in economics, marketing, and psychology.  The 
appreciation is applicable for ownership and fans.  Time constraints and 
high-values can influence the appreciation (Drexel University, 2005).  It is 
not often a team is sold, and this puts a time constraint pressure on potential 
ownership groups.  The groups have a perception of high-values associated 
with the teams in ticket, merchandise, and sponsorship sales.  This drives the 
appreciation of team value year after year. 
 Fan psychology can also lead to team value appreciation.  Live sport is 
not renewable; sport is consumed the moment it is seen.  Though fans can 
watch a game on television or on replay, there is something special for fans 
when attending a championship game or an important match against a rival 
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side.  The time constraint drives fans to consume these important moments, 
raising the demand for tickets perceived as high-value.   
 Potential ownership groups and fan psychology are just two examples 
of quick value appreciation.  These compounded can show how the scarcity 
of teams in the professional sport market drives sport commodities to 
appreciate in value yearly.    
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Tax Breaks and the Government Sweethearts 
 
 The stadium issues discussed previously are the most visible form of 
public subsidization transferring into help for professional sports.  However, 
owners still maintain the financial difficulty of teams to keep public help 
coming.  The public continues to help professional sport teams’ owners 
through tax breaks and “sweetheart deals.”   
  Owners see tax help in a bevvy of ways with their sports teams.  
Professional sports teams exist as scarce commodities, which economically 
speaking appreciate quickly.  When a professional team is sold, the IRS sees 
the profits for the owner as capital gains. Given the current tax code, lower 
tax rates are applied to these profits than other sources of income.  This 
allows owners to turn a vast profit, while the teams are still seen as public 
subsidies.  Subsidies for stadium renovations help in this regard as well by 
increasing the value of a team.  The Cleveland Indians of MLB, for example, 
had a market value of $81 million in 1993; the next year the team opened a 
new stadium and the value climbed to $100 million.  By the time the team 
was sold in late 1999 the valuation climbed to $320 million; there was a 
return of 295% in just seven years, meaning large capital gains for the former 
owner (Eitzen, 2000).   
 The second tax benefit is a unique one that siphons money into the 
pocket of owners, as an indirect benefit that has hefty tax implications.  This 
occurs, “when a business buys game tickets, stadium food, or seats in a 
[luxury box], then hands them out to its favored patrons, it is allowed to 
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write off half the cost as a business expense (Eitzen, 2000).”  Writing off the 
tickets as business expenses results in taxpayers covering a portion of the 
cost of employees and business prospects attending sporting events.  
Corporations are therefore inclined to continue to offer this perk because of 
the tax write-off.  This also helps maintain inflation of ticket and luxury box 
costs.  The indirect corporate subsidy, “alone costs the federal treasury more 
than $80 million in lost tax revenue (Eitzen, 2000).” 
 Additionally, local governments continue the subsidization with 
certain sweetheart deals, which serve as a tangible “icing on the cake.”  These 
sweetheart deals start with simple aspects like renovation and up-keep of 
roads and parking lots necessary for fans to get to the games.  Cities will 
often times help owners with, “moving expenses, practice facilities, office 
space, land, and special investment opportunities to entice them to stay or to 
move their team to the city (Eitzen, 2000).”  These are additional forms of 
help afforded to owners in hopes of keeping teams in the city.   
 As discussed previously, the player depreciation has tax implications 
as well, whereby allowing team owners to use these deductions as tax losses.  
“No other business in the United States depreciates the value of human 
beings as part of the cost of its operation (Eitzen, 2000).”  It is interesting to 
note despite owners writing-off player depreciation, players who diminish in 
value are not able to have a personal tax write-off.    
 The tax breaks and sweetheart deals, discussed in this section for 
owners, is just the tip of the iceberg.  As detailed throughout the thesis, the 
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current revenue sharing and player compensation models in professional 
sports afford owners the opportunity to maximize personal profits at times 
in spite of the implications for their teams.  The models coupled with the 
varying public subsidization avenues of the private sport industry reveals a 
need for a solution to the creative accounting practices.     
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A Potential Solution 
 
 There is a definite need to understand the true value of a team with 
varied strategic accounting practices detailed throughout the previous 
sections of the thesis,.  When discussing collective bargaining agreements, 
the implications on revenue sharing and player compensation, owners are 
guarded.  This appears to be a natural business mindset.  Owners want to 
protect and retain as much of the revenue created by their teams, assets, and 
associated companies as possible.  As shown through the questionable 
accounting practices regarding revenue and expense reporting, players are 
unable to see the true value of teams and the overall financial wealth of the 
league.  This is critical to understand when calculating a fair level of player 
share in league profits.   
 Additionally, owners leverage the emotional and economic 
importance of teams to increase the value of teams and, in turn, increase the 
revenue siphoned into their pockets.  The public and local governments 
deserve to know the true value and worth of professional sport teams.  This 
understanding is especially important, when these parties are directing 
millions of tax dollars for stadium construction and sweetheart deals; as well 
as giving owners tax breaks, which could instead help raise revenues for the 
state and municipalities to offset the cost of stadiums.  If states across the 
board created a uniform stance when it comes to professional sport teams, 
then owners wouldn’t have as much leverage; these teams could bring 
additional revenues to their cities.   
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 This is not the current reality, however, nor is it on the horizon.  Given 
this situation, wouldn’t it be appropriate for taxpayers and local 
governments to expect a certain level of transparency or understanding in 
the valuation of the teams who ask a great deal, in monetary terms, from 
them?  This appears to be a pivotal question for now and in the future.     
 Every year, Forbes Magazine attempts to calculate team valuations.  
They paint a picture of teams valued upward of billions of dollars.  The 
magazine is said to use a variety of calculations in their valuations, including 
sponsorship, fan reach, and associated business.  This evidently paints a 
different picture than the one that league executives reveal to players when 
collective bargaining agreement time comes.  Forbes claims to use a full 
picture approach, but seems to overstate the bottom-line of a team.   
 Getting close to a true idea of where a team is in a given year is 
important for players, taxpayers, and local governments alike.  Nearly every 
professional sports team in America is a private entity, however, there is no 
requirement for a release of financials, which would give the full picture of 
true team wealth.  As a result, the public should use certain sets of data that 
are available year after year to calculate percentages like player 
compensation caps, revenue sharing, taxation, and public subsidies. 
 A constant struggle for owners is maximizing fan interest while 
simultaneously maximizing team revenues.  The largest expense for teams, 
based on league standards, is player expense.  Therefore there is an 
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important question of how can a team structure their player salary levels in 
order to fit the needs of their fans?  
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Method of Using Ticket Sales 
  
 The thesis attacks this question in three professional leagues, Major 
League Baseball, National Basketball Association, and Major League Soccer.  
Ticket sales figures are made public after games, as are player salaries at the 
end of each season.  These are critical in solving the concurrent maximization 
of team allotment for player salaries and ticket sales.  The hope is for owners 
to use this quantitative analysis as a potential means of increasing efficiency 
within their teams and, in turn, relax their creative accounting practices.  The 
increased team-spending efficiency will allow owners to turn greater team 
profits.   
 This thesis gives a proposition to utilize ticket sales figures as a means 
to figure a better picture of the inancial status of teams.  Given the 
assumption that teams spend a relatively equal percentage on utilities and 
ancillary expenses in relation to the size of their stadium, ticket sales can 
indicate fan and business interest in a team for a means of valuation. 
 A regression analysis was used to test how fans of different teams in 
different leagues respond to the standard deviation of salaries on a team.  Do 
fans increase their ticket spending when there are a few All-Star players on a 
team and lesser-paid role-players, i.e. the Miami Heat, to fit in under the 
salary tax? Or do fans like a balanced budget approach?  Or is the salary 
dispersion of a team inconsequential to fans? 
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 These questions led to the testing payroll information’s affect on 
attendance.  From the seasons of 2001 to 2012 information from the MLB, 
MLS, and NBA was taken to understand a potential relationship. Total 
payroll, average salary, median salary, standard deviation of salary, the top 3 
players’ salary, and the sum of those three players’ salary were calculated 
based on figures provided on the websites of USA Today, the Washington 
Post, InsideHoops, MLS Players, and bigapplesoccer.com.  The aim was to 
provide regression analysis from the NFL as well but there wasn’t enough 
complete information available for the NFL salary and attendance figures.   
 The attendance figures of games played, total attendance, average 
game attendance, and percentage of stadium filled, as well as those same 
figures for home and away games were calculated based on figures provided 
on the websites of ESPN and kenn.com (for the MLS information).   
 Additionally in order to paint a better picture of each city’s economic 
landscape, total population and per capita personal income figures were 
retrieved from city-data.com.  Population and income help provide additional 
information on potential other factors in attendance change.  Generally there 
would be an expectation that with higher population and income ticket sales 
would increase as well.          
 The information gathered from these sites allowed for a regression 
analysis to be run testing attendance as the dependent variable against 
independent variables of payroll and salary distribution or deviation on a 
team.  The standard deviation of salary was used as the measure of salary 
Comment [RP1]: Should explain that the 
standard deviation of salary was used as the 
measure of salary dispersion.  The greater 
the standard deviation, the larger the gap 
between the highest and lowest paid 
players. 
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dispersion on the team.  High standard deviation reveals a team who pays 
large amounts to a few players, and then less to the rest of the team.  A low 
standard deviation is found on the team with evenly dispersed payment to 
players.  There was additional testing performed with population and income 
serving as added independent variables to create a more complete picture, 
but they do not serve as the focal point of this analysis.    
 The results of the regression analysis can be seen at the end of this 
section and reveals interesting information about the fans of each major 
league with differing result patterns for each.  The most important findings to 
take away from the regression analysis, for the purpose of this thesis, are the 
t-statistic for PAYROLL and STDEVSAL.  These values, in relation to 0, 
indicate how responsive fans/attendance can be to changes in payroll and 
the deviation, dispersion, of salary amongst teammates.  The further away 
from 0 in a positive direction, especially greater than 2, indicates a strong 
relationship between the stated independent and related dependent 
variable; inversely, a negative indicates an indirect relationship.  A brief 
explanation of the results for each league can be seen after the regression 
results for that respective league.   
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MLB Regression Analysis 
 
Quantitative Regression Analysis of MLB Attendance and Payroll 2001-2013  
Dependent Variable: Attendance 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic * (statistical 
significance) 
C 916560.6 1.209182 0.2277 
Population 0.122383 1.346091 0.1794 
Income 2.826280 0.198790 0.8426 
Payroll 0.021436 10.29479 0.0000 
Standard 
Deviation Salary -0.224718 -4.713254 0.0000 
R-Squared- 0.818312 
  
 
 The regression of the MLB points to the notion that fans will increase 
their spending and interest in a team the larger the payroll becomes as 
indicated by the t-statistic being upwards of a value of 10 with a substantially 
strong probability.  However, the fans do not respond to the spending on 
particular players.  Their interest does not rest upon having the top all-star 
players on the roster, which can be attributed to the fact that baseball 
requires more players than say the NBA or MLS to have a successful team.  
Not only does a team need the starting nine players for baseball, but also a 
pitching rotation with depth is key for success.  This is an interesting take 
where fans appreciate team spending but do not necessitate spending a large 
sum on particular players, where role players take a salary hit in order to 
afford those All-Star talents.    
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MLS Regression Analysis  
 
Quantitative Regression Analysis of MLS Attendance and Payroll 2004-2013  
Dependent Variable: Attendance 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic * (statistical 
significance) 
C 188303.0 2.113468 0.0373 
Population 0.000842 0.244287 0.8076 
Income 0.961730 0.429049 0.6689 
Payroll 0.004404 0.308251 0.7586 
Standard 
Deviation Salary 0.048536 0.474912 0.6360 
R-Squared- 0.10585 
  
 
 
 
 The MLS fans seem to take a different stance than those of the MLB 
and NBA.  As evident by the low t-statistic values neither payroll spending 
nor the deviation of salaries among players has a strong effect on fan 
attendance.  This is an important note to MLS owners because it shows 
investment in high-priced talent is not necessary for their fan bases.  Instead, 
owners may want to focus their spending on the fan experience, affording 
fans entertainment at half time or creating marketing schemes for certain 
games as drivers, which would increase attendance.   
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NBA Regression Analysis 
 
Quantitative Regression Analysis of NBA Attendance and Payroll 2001-2012  
Dependent Variable: Attendance 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic * (statistical 
significance) 
C 576641.9 17.66363 0.0000 
Population 0.007188 2.439626 0.0153 
Income -0.413848 -2.506924 0.0127 
Payroll 0.001256 2.147202 0.0326 
Standard 
Deviation Salary 0.010040 1.590261 0.1128 
R-Squared- 0.165464 
  
 
 
 The NBA regression analysis shares a similarity with the MLB in that 
their fans respond to more spending on the team as a whole.  The NBA fan 
differs from those in the MLB in that there is more responsiveness to a roster 
with increased standard deviation.  This supports the general trend in the 
NBA to sign two to three All-Star caliber talents in order to drive not only fan 
support but also wins.  The Boston Celtics signed three star talents in Kevin 
Garnett, Ray Allen, and Paul Pierce and stood atop the league as champions.  
The Miami Heat were next with signing LeBron James, Chris Bosh, and 
Dwayne Wade and have won two championships to this point.  Not only is 
signing all-stars and filling the remaining space in the cap with veteran role 
players a championship winning formula, but it seems to also help in 
garnering fan support and ticket dollars.   
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 This regression approach can be expanded upon if owners gave full 
transparency to merchandise sales and television ratings in addition to ticket 
sales.  Owners can use the model to understand the responsiveness of their 
fans as a means to be equitable to their players, taxpayers, local 
governments, and fans.  This can breed increased spending efficiency and 
less of a need for creative accounting practices that come with ethical 
questionability.   
 The regression model serves to help expand revenues for owners, but 
it does not necessarily give owners an incentive to stop their creative 
accounting practices.  Though not perfect, thisThe model gives owners a 
potential solution to how teams could spend their salary-designated dollars 
without “bending” the rules.  With a greater emphasis on revenue generation, 
as detailed in the regression, teams and leagues could rely less on 
government subsidies.  However, in the long run the government and 
taxpayers would need to lead in the elimination of the creative accounting 
practices.   
 The regression highlights the differences and preferences across the 
MLB, MLS, and NBA, but is not a creative accounting solution.  Instead, the 
goal of the analysis is to give insight on revenue generation to help teams if 
rules change in relation to creative accounting or public subsidies.  This 
model helps to provide an alternative to the creative accounting practices, 
but unless owners are required to stop the practices by the government, it is 
unlikely to see any change.   
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Concluding the Journey 
 
 The goal of this thesis was a simple one with complicated avenues: 
explore the accounting practices of owners in professional sports.  These 
practices have current relevance as all the major professional sport leagues 
in the United States have restructured their collective bargaining agreements 
in the past five years.  Owners create personal salaries, broadcasting rights, 
and contracting fees, among others, to increase operational expenses.  These 
practices aim to increase their personal profits with little regard for shared 
revenues and players’ deserved shares.  Additionally, the practices have 
important implications for the everyday Americans as taxpayers.  Owners 
leverage taxpayers’ emotional ties to teams for public subsidization of their 
private teams.  Furthermore, nearly every state government supports the 
professional sport teams in their region.  Given this, the thesis aimed to 
investigate and propose a potential solution to the creative accounting 
practices of professional sport team owners.  
 The first step was a discussion on the accounting practices used by 
professional sport owners, the structuring of the big four professional sport 
leagues, and how they govern revenue sharing and player compensation in 
their leagues.  The NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL all differ slightly in the 
structures of percentages shared among teams and this affects the way 
players are paid.  Some of the leagues have a hard cap that sets a maximum 
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that teams can spend on their rosters; others have soft caps, when breached 
bring tax revenues to the league for further sharing.  With revenue sharing 
and salary capping, leagues aim to create competitive balance and maximize 
league-wide popularity and profitability.  Even as this is the goal for all four 
major professional leagues, the one common thread running through all of 
the major sport leagues is the issue of owners attempting to hide or expense 
out their revenues.  This creates the most personal profit possible but in the 
end skews the valuation of these teams and detracts from league-wide 
competitive balance.  Understanding the value and bottom line of teams is 
important when players look for fair compensation and ancillary benefits, 
such as medical coverage, for all players, current and former. 
 The next piece of the thesis explored several examples on how owners 
leverage the perceived, emotional and financial, importance of the team to a 
given city to extract as much public, monetary subsidization as possible.  
Traditionally sport teams were privately funded entities, however, owners 
have been able to shift funding to public sources by, often times, threatening 
a city move if their requests were not obliged.  The use of public funds for 
stadiums has seen a drastic increase since the turn of the century across the 
country, generally during periods of education and human services cuts.  
Owners used their similar creative accounting practices in these cases to 
plead their team’s financial instability as a means to receive public 
subsidization.  Generally, local governments not only yield to these requests 
but also make it highly profitable for owners of sport teams.  Through tax 
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breaks and sweetheart deals there is an “icing on the cake” for owners to 
maximize their private profits on a publicly subsidized business.  Aid in 
constructing and revitalizing stadiums coupled with tax breaks and 
sweetheart deals, have increased owners’ personal profits exponentially 
without requiring the amounts to be shared with taxpayers or local 
governments.     
 With these practices in mind, this thesis proposed an alternative to 
curve the need for the commonly detrimental creative accounting practices.  
Utilizing ticket sales as a potential important variable, owners can create 
more efficient cost structuring.  If owners can increase their efficiency in 
player salary structuring, there is less of a need to use questionable 
accounting practices.  The practices serve to increase their personal profits, 
but this regression model can step in and serve as a replacement.   
  Even though ticket sales were used as the tested variable in the 
regression, team owners could also use this model with merchandise and 
sponsorship sales figures to focus on how player salary spending affects 
these revenue streams as well.  Ultimately, this shift would be realized only if 
owners were required by the government and taxpayers to halt their creative 
accounting practices.    
 Taxpayers and local governments should call for a regulation and shift 
in creative accounting practices.  By using fan interest as an indication of 
team values, players, taxpayers, and local governments can start to better 
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understand the value of a team when calculating percentages of revenue 
sharing and aid given to the owners of professional sport teams. 
 The thesis sought to not only explore the current state of accounting 
practices in America’s professional sports, but also open the eyes of the 
public and hold owners accountable when claiming financial instability on 
teams generating massive private revenues.   
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Appendices 
 
MLB Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: HTOTATT    
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 07/28/13   Time: 06:22   
Sample: 2001 2011   
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 28   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 308  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 916560.6 758000.6 1.209182 0.2277 
POP 0.122383 0.090917 1.346091 0.1794 
INC 2.826280 14.21739 0.198790 0.8426 
PAYROLL 0.021436 0.002082 10.29479 0.0000 
STDEVSAL -0.224718 0.047678 -4.713254 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.818312    Mean dependent var 2458517. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.790308    S.D. dependent var 722656.4 
S.E. of regression 330920.0    Akaike info criterion 28.38326 
Sum squared resid 2.91E+13    Schwarz criterion 28.89191 
Log likelihood -4329.023    Hannan-Quinn criter. 28.58665 
F-statistic 29.22073    Durbin-Watson stat 1.197885 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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MLS Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: HTOTATT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/28/13   Time: 06:28   
Sample: 1 96    
Included observations: 96   
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 188303.0 89096.72 2.113468 0.0373 
POP 0.000842 0.003448 0.244287 0.8076 
INC 0.961730 2.241538 0.429049 0.6689 
PAYROLL 0.004404 0.014287 0.308251 0.7586 
STDEVSAL 0.048536 0.102199 0.474912 0.6360 
     
     R-squared 0.105859    Mean dependent var 260277.8 
Adjusted R-squared 0.066556    S.D. dependent var 91016.23 
S.E. of regression 87935.25    Akaike info criterion 25.65727 
Sum squared resid 7.04E+11    Schwarz criterion 25.79083 
Log likelihood -1226.549    Hannan-Quinn criter. 25.71125 
F-statistic 2.693407    Durbin-Watson stat 0.981936 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.035780    
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NBA Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: HTOTATT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/28/13   Time: 06:33   
Sample: 1 305    
Included observations: 303   
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=5) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 576641.9 32645.71 17.66363 0.0000 
POP 0.007188 0.002947 2.439626 0.0153 
INC -0.413848 0.165082 -2.506924 0.0127 
PAYROLL 0.001256 0.000585 2.147202 0.0326 
STDEVSAL 0.010040 0.006314 1.590261 0.1128 
     
     R-squared 0.165464    Mean dependent var 704816.1 
Adjusted R-squared 0.154262    S.D. dependent var 94774.63 
S.E. of regression 87158.56    Akaike info criterion 25.60521 
Sum squared resid 2.26E+12    Schwarz criterion 25.66649 
Log likelihood -3874.189    Hannan-Quinn criter. 25.62973 
F-statistic 14.77112    Durbin-Watson stat 0.595741 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
